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1. Introduction
The world has witnessed a tantalizing mass violence committed by state and non-state actors over the years.
As Williams and Buckley-Zistel noted, “the 20th century has often been labeled the century of genocides
and mass violence [and…] questions regarding the perpetration of violence continue to be pertinent”.1 At
the end of the state-perpetrated violence, two important perplexing questions need to be addressed: the first
one is how to ensure post-violence accountability or punish impunity, and the second one concerns how to
transform a society wrecked by war and prolonged conflicts into a durable peace in a non-violent means.2
One such effort to deal with these questions is through the implementation of a transitional justice measures
whose vitality increased since 1990s.3 Generally, transitional justice encompasses a broader theme than
criminal prosecutions though criminal justice processes (trials, tribunals, or vetting of perpetrators) are the
most prominent in the transitional justice discourse.4
According to David Crocker, the conceptual notion of transitional justice should rest on eight goals: truth,
public platform for victims, accountability and punishment, the rule of law, compensation to victims,
institutional reform, long-term development, reconciliation and public deliberation.5 The point is that
individual measures are inadequate so that employing them in a holistic approach helps better theorize and
understand transitional justice measures. Drawing its foundational inspiration from the Nuremberg trials,
the contemporary understanding of TJ has been expanded after the overthrow of dictatorships in Latin
America, the end of cold war politics, the largescale conflicts in the Balkan region, and widespread violence
in Africa and Asia.6
Ethiopia has had a brief experience of implementing transitional justice measures of one sort or other,
specifically the one related to Derg’s ‘Red Terror’ trials. In 1974, the popular revolution in Ethiopia brought
a half-century rule of Emperor Hailesellassie I and feudal aristocracy of ancien regime to its end. Due to
the absence of organized political party, the military committee called Derg, came to control power. Though
war and violence perpetrated by state or regional warlords are not uncommon in Ethiopia, the statesanctioned perpetration of violence reached its highest point during the years of 1975-78. This was the time
when a military junta called Derg, after overthrowing the last emperor of ancien regime in 1974, unleashed

1

Buckley-Zistel, S., Beck. T. K., Braun, C. & Mieth, F. (2014). Transitional Justice Theories: An Introduction. In S.
Buckley-Zistel, T. Koloma Beck, C. Braun & F. Mieth (eds.), Transitional Justice Theories (pp. 1-16). Oxon and New
York: Routledge, p. 1.
2
Jarstad, A.K., & Sisk, T.D., (eds.). (2008). From War To Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
3
Joanna R. Quinn, (2017), The Development of Transitional Justice, In Lawther, Cheryl, Moffet, L. & Jacobs, D.,
(eds.), Research Handbook on Transitional Justice, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 11-33.
4
Anja Mihr, (2017), Regime Consolidation through Transitional Justice in Europe: The Case of Germany, Spain,
Turkey, International Journal of Transitional Justice Vol. 11, Issue 1, pp. 113-131.
5
. David Crocker (1999) as cited in Buckley-Zistel, S., Beck. T. K., Braun, C. & Mieth, F. (2014). Transitional Justice
Theories: An Introduction. In S. Buckley-Zistel, T. Koloma Beck, C. Braun & F. Mieth (eds.), Transitional Justice
Theories (pp. 1-16). Oxon and New York: Routledge, p. 5.
6
Levis Oneg (2012). Introduction, In Moses Chrispus Okello el al (eds), Where the Law Meets Reality: Forging
African Transitional Justice, Cape Town: Pambazuka Press, p.1.
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what came to be infamously known as mass killing campaign of ‘red terror’ against students, intelligentsia
and other social forces whom it labelled ‘anti-revolutionary’ and ‘reactionary forces’.7
It unleashed a revolutionary killing campaign infamously known as ‘Red Terror’ against civilian
organizations who opposed its ascendancy to power. This heinously devoured thousands of students,
intellectual and opposition forces who were labelled as ‘enemies of revolution’, ‘anti-revolutionary,’ and
reactionary forces’.8 This augurs with tantalizing mass violence committed in the name of the state which
the world has witnessed that resulted in far more deaths and destruction of property than compared to
‘conventional offenders’.9 The most serious state crimes are genocides, crimes against humanity, terror,
politicide, inhumane and degrading treatment and other kinds of politically motivated mass violence. The
major aim of the state-perpetrated violence is “to take systematic actions against particular groups for their
destruction or subjugation”.10
Following the collapse of Derg by the struggle of ethno-regional forces, the victorious coalition called
Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (hereinafter called EPRDF) established a Transitional
Government (TGE) in 1991 and attempted to take a certain form of transitional justice measures in the postCold War context. In 1992, TGE established a Special Prosecutor’s Office (hereinafter called SPO) as a
responsible organ to deal with Derg’s Red Terror atrocities. Its key mandate was to investigate and bring
perpetrators to criminal trials, and also ancillary role to produce historical records for posterity. The trial
was the first attempt of its kind in African continent to deal with genocide and crimes against humanity
solely by domestic tribunal. Moreover, the Red Terror trial “constitute the most extensive judgement of
human rights violations since the Nuremberg trials at the end of the Second World War”.11 The government
also decided to undertake the trial by its own in domestic courts. The lengthy trial culminated nearly after
two decades in 2007 when the former leader col. Mengistu Hailemariam was found guilty of genocide and
sentenced to death in abstentia. However, Ethiopia only barely figures in international transitional or postconflict justice literatures and scholarly work on it is scanty.
While the EPRDF’s response to the Derg’s atrocities partly succeeds in avoiding impunity, the response
measures were not without challenges. As this paper strongly argues, one of the limitations was that the
response adopted the narrower model of transitional justice measures. The trial process was also criticized
as imposition of the victor’s interpretation of justice, whose legitimacy was also compromised by the
climate of continued human rights violations by current regime itself. Therefore, given the current political
turmoil, a question as to what the achievements and limitations of Ethiopia’s response were, and whether
the country has utilized the Red Terror trials as a critical learning opportunity to realize societal
transformation should be re-examined. So, by making a review of literature, laws and government reports,
Trovoll, K., Schaefer, C. & Girmachew Alemu Aneme (2009). The ‘Red Terror’ Trials: The Context of Transitional
Justice in Ethiopia. In K. Trovoll, C. Schaefer, & Girmachew Alemu Aneme (eds). The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials:
Transitional Justice Challenged. (pp.1-16). Suffolk: James Currey.
8
Tronvoll, Schaefer & Girmachew, (2009), ibid; Jennifer Balint, (2012), Genocide, State Crime and the Law: In the
Name of the State. Oxon: Routledge.
9
Rohne, H. C., Arsovska, J., & Aertsen, I. (2008). Challenging Restorative Justice-State-based Conflict, Mass
Victimsation and the Changing Nature of Warfare. In I. Aertsen, J. Arsovska, H.C. Rohne, M. Valinas & K.
Vanspauwen (eds.). Restoring Justice After Large-Scale Violent Conflicts: Kosovo, DR Congo and the IsraeliPalestinian Case (pp. 3-45). Devon: William Publishing.
10
Balint, J. (2012). Genocide, State Crime and the Law: In the Name of the State. Oxon: Routledge, p. 14.
11
Independent. (1 April 1996). Masters of Ethiopia’s Red Terror Face Trial for Genocide. Retrieved
from
:https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/masters-of-ethiopias-red-terror-facetrial-for-genocide-1302752.html
7
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this paper attempts to make balanced assessment of the achievements and limitations of the Red Terror
trials in relation to then available alternatives and current mainstream transitional justice frameworks.
The paper has seven sections. Following this introduction, section two discusses the coming to power of
Derg and puts the Red Terror crimes in context. Section three provides a brief overview of the concept of
transitional justice in post-conflict context. Section four examines the measures taken by Ethiopia against
transitional justice frameworks. The fifth section briefly looks at the achievements and challenges of the
Red Terror trials, and the last section concludes.
2. The 1974 Revolution and the Coming to Power of the Derg
2.1.
The Revolution
The mainstream historiography of Ethiopia holds that it existed as a polity for about three thousand years.
However, Ethiopia with its present geographical territory and ethno-linguistic component emerged only in
the 19th century. King Menelik of Shoa (later emperor) launched successive conquests to adjoining
territories incorporating formerly autonomous peoples of the south, southeast and southwest.12 After his
death in 1916, the traditional autocracy took its modern shape when Ras Tefer Mekonnen, a regent to the
throne since 1916, claimed lineage from ‘Tribe of Judah’, and self-sanctified ‘Elect of God’, came to be
crowned as Emperor Hailesellassie I of Ethiopia in 1931.13 Seen as a reformer, he introduced the country’s
first ever modern written constitution and established bi-cameral parliament.14 The period after a brief
Italian occupation of Ethiopia (1936-41) saw a gradually precipitation of the opposition to the regime,
which was inflicted by extreme centralization, with archaic exploitative feudal economic system. This
system turned the bulk of southern peoples of the country to landless tenants and serfdom later resulting in
peasant rebellions. However, the most significant and radical challenge leading to the downfall of the
decaying monarchical order came from a notable Ethiopian Students Movement who were battling the
ancien regime since mid-1960s.15
According to a historian Bahru Zewde,16 the year 1965 is conventionally taken as a “landmark in the history
of the Ethiopian Student Movement … [and] era of revolutionary commitment” when the University
students chanted “Land to the Tiller” in their demonstration in Addis Ababa. In the absence of political
organizations and in defiance of old political order, the students’ movement assumed the “burden of
opposition with heroism and dignity”.17 After spontaneous strikes by the teachers, students, taxi drivers,
the army also mutinied in parallel, the first one of which took place in ‘Sidamo’, south Ethiopia in Jan.
1974. This was followed by mutiny of the army fighting in Eritrea.18 Gradually, their demands grew more
than material benefits such as salary increase. Despite its earlier moderate orientations, a clandestine and
12

Bahru Zewde, (1991), The History of Modern Ethiopia (1st ed). London: James Currey; Merera, (2003), Competing
Ethnic Nationalism and the Quest for Democracy, 1960-2000, Maastricht: Shaker Publishing.
13
Bahiru Zewde, (1991), ibid.
14
James C.N Paul & Christopher Clapham, (1967), Ethiopian Constitutional Development: A Source Book, Vol. 2.
HIS University Press.
15
Balsvik, R. (1985). Haile Sellassie’s Students: The Intellectual and Social Background to Ethiopian Revolution,
1952-1977. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.; Bahru, (1991).
16
Bahru Zewde (2014), The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement c. 1960-74. London: James
Currey. p. 101.
17
Bahru Zewde (2014), ibid, p. 226.
18
John Markakis, (2011), Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers. Suffolk and New York: James Currey.
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more radical wing was formed by the low-ranking military officers who “shared a radical left-wing
revolutionary orientation”.19 Amidst growing opposition and decaying monarchical order, the old regime
crumbled. On 12 September 1974, the monarchy who reigned for half a century was deposed by the military
officers and was reported dead within a year ‘under suspicious circumstances’.20 Summarized in a single
sentence, the cause of the revolution “came from the incapacity of a post-feudal socio-political system to
modernize itself when faced with the challenges of the transformation of the second half of the twentieth
century”.21
The regime change that took place in Ethiopia in 1974 marks a real revolution and was the “... the only
major social revolution yet to have occurred in Africa”.22 A long-time Ethiopianist political scientist
Clapham thus writes: “A revolution marks a fundamental and irreversible change in the organization of a
society; [...] Such a change has taken place in Ethiopia: a change indeed in many ways comparable to those
experienced during the ‘classic’ revolutions of France and Russia”.23
2.2.

The Coming to Power of Derg and Prelude to ‘Red Terror’

The popular revolution which was rallied by intelligentsia, teachers, taxi drivers and other members of
society came to a direct confrontation with the military. For years, the Ethiopian army remained a separate,
privileged social class and was strong and better army next only to South African due to American help.24
The Derg’s come to power should not be of much surprise. While a radical student opposition to the old
regime heightened, ‘clear and viable alternatives’ have not been formulated. According to Claudio Moffa:
“Inspite of the clear political character of their demands, neither the students nor the working
class nor other sections of the urban population (not to speak of the peasants) had managed to give
birth to a coherent organization that could operate nationally…In this situation, the power vacuum
that had happened could not be filled by any other social groups except the army, the only
organized force existing in the country. And it was with this army that all “parties” would
henceforth have to deal with”.25
In the absence of clear alternatives and strong political organization due to what Markakis calls “lack of
imagination”26, military as the only organized body came to seize such opportunity. After establishing a
Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), the Derg started to launch series of brutal campaign
of state mass murder of what later came to be known as ‘red terror’. In the words of a prominent observer,
19

Gerard Prunier, (2015), The Ethiopian Revolution and the Derg Regime. In G. Prunier & E. Ficquet (eds.).
Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia: Monarch, Revolution and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi, London: Hurst, (pp.
209-232), p. 216.
20
Weibel, (2017), The Ethiopian Red Terror. In T. Spear (ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia: African History,
(pp.NA). Oxford: Oxford University Press; Kjetil Tronvoll, 2013), Ethiopia, In Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice,
Vol. 2, (pp.167-173), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
21
Pruneir, (2015), p. 211.
22
Clapham, C., (2004). The Challenge of Democratization in Ethiopia, Whitehall Papers, 62:1, 71-82, p. 76)
23
Clapham, C. (1988). Transformation and Continuity in a Revolutionary Ethiopia, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, p. 1.
24
Gerard Prunier, (2015), The Ethiopian Revolution, ibid.
25
As quoted in Prunier, 2015, p. 217)
26
Markakis (2011), p. 180.
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“the authors of revolution who were youthful urban intelligentsia” were “fated to be devoured by the
revolution they unleashed”,27 and the red terror targeted that end as we shall see below.
2.3.

The Unleashing of the ‘Red Terror’

“The Ethiopian Red Terror is the most significant and least studied atrocity of late twentieth century
Africa”.28
Bereft of ideological guidance, Derg hijacked the ‘Land to the Tiller’, the revolutionary slogan of students,
and afterwards, Marxism and Ethiopian nationalism were employed. While radical Marxism (later
Ethiopia’s scientific socialism) provided ideological guidance, Ethiopian nationalism, manifested by ‘a
commitment to nation-state project was the revolution’s driving force’.29
Thereafter, the Derg mobilized the students to countryside for Zemecha, literacy campaign to educate the
peasantry on the Marxist credentials. The Zemecha was seen as a tactic to remove radical challengers and
civilian rivals from the urban centers in its bid to control power absolutely. Then, the civilian component
of the revolution came to the direct confrontation and determined to fight even for their life.30 The MEISON
(Amharic abbreviation for All Ethiopian Socialist Movement) and EPRP (Ethiopian Peoples’
Revolutionary Party), the two civilian organizations emerging from the students’ movement, emerged to
challenge the Derg’s dictatorship and called to establish civilian government.31
While MEISON followed a gradualist approach and initially agreed to collaborate with the Derg hoping to
tame and educate it, the radical EPRP, whose hostility grew against the military, refused to collaborate for
the mobilization of the masses. Afterwards launched the operation of random killing, well grounded in the
major cities against the military officers and its civilian allies. The Derg dubbed it “anarchist, “enemy of
the revolution”, as “white terror” and responded with what it named ‘red terror against white terror’ named
along the Russian counterpart of 1917 revolution period.32 Frictions and enmity between EPRP and
MEISON also precipitated ground for further suicidal red terror. Red terror was exemplified by adopting
‘extrajudicial revolutionary violence’ as the official practice of the regime.” The years from 1976 to 1978
marked the heyday of the Red Terror in which “public killings became a normalized aspect of Ethiopia’s
revolutionary situation”.33
No one accurately tells when the Red Terror started. Bahru Zewde argues that the situation of initial armed
confrontation started from within the army on the early days when they deposed the emperor on 12

27

John Markakis (2011, p. 161), ibid.
Alex de Waal, (2019), [blurb comment to] Conley, B. (2019). Memory from the Margins: Ethiopia’s Red Terror
Martyrs Museum, Palgrave MacMillan.
29
Markakis, (2011), p. 161.
30
Pruneir, (2015), ibid.
31
Clapham, (1988), ibid.
32
(Trovoll, 2013).
33
(Weibel, 2017)
28
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September 1974.34 Friction between initial chair General Aman Andom and Major Mengistu “precipitated
not only the death of the General, but also the summary execution of over 50 government officials and
dignitaries as well as dissidents from within the military. The execution of ‘the sixty’ [members of imperial
government] initiated a culture of massive killing with impunity”.35 This gradually laid the ground for the
would-be state killings and also breed the seeds of ‘Red Terror’. “[T]he penalty for being on the wrong side
was almost always death”.36 After rounds of purging its members, Mengistu Hailemariam emerged as the
sole undisputed dictator.37
In a remarkable coincidence, one of the atrocious regimes, a Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia,
conducts the similar atrocity and from 1975 to 1978, roughly one and half to two million people perished.38
In the words of one historian, “From late 1976 to the end of 1978, Ethiopia was to live through two
particularly atrocious years”.39 Series of terror were unleashed, and a historian captures the third phase of
it as follows:
“The carnage of May Day 1977 was the dress rehearsal for the massive killing that characterized
the third phase of government terror. If the [earlier] phase [s] of terror was measured and centrally
directed, the third was one where every ‘revolutionary’ became a law into himself. This was the
period of ‘netsa ermejja’ (which could be translated in broad terms as unrestricted license to kill).
Terror had become democratized! The Addis Ababa city council at the top and the kebeles at the
bottom were entrusted with their indispensable revolutionary defense squads at the bottom were
entrusted with full authority to kill any suspect…”.40
People as victims were terrorized and summarily executed by the revolutionary bodies, sometimes at dark
“and their bodies left in the open to serve as a deterrent to all those who were harboring similar thoughts of
counter-revolution”.41 The most extreme of brutality of the Derg, the bodies of the massacred were left in
the streets ‘to be ravaged by hyenas at night. Some families who were fortunate enough to identify the
bodies of their murdered youths were required to pay for the bullets that were used to kill their sons and
daughters before they could take the corpse for a proper funeral”.42 Executioner shoots twice since it was
profitable as victim’s relatives paid for each bullet.43
The Derg’s notorious killing campaign of red terror was “the most systematic and infamous campaign of
human rights violations perpetrated by the Derg…[which] killed a generation of mostly young intellectuals

34

Bahru Zewde (2009), The History of Red Terror: Contexts & Consequences. In K. Trovoll, C. Schaefer and
Girmachew Alemu Aneme (eds.). The Ethiopian Red Terror Trials: Transitional Justice Challenged (pp. 17-32).
Suffolk: James Currey.
35
Bahru, (2009), ibid, p. 23.
36
Clapham, (1988), p. 52.
37
Clapham, (1988), ibid.
38
Cheryl S. White (2017), Bridging Divides in Transitional Justice: The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, Antwerp, Cambridge: Intersentia.
39
Gerard Prunier, (2015), ibid, p. 220.
40
Bahru, (2009), p. 28.
41
Bahru, (2009), p. 29.
42
Kjetil Tronvoll et al, (2009), p. 3.
43
Luc Huyse, (2009), All Thingd Pass, Except the Past. New Goff, Mariakerke: AWEPA, p. 76.
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without a resort to the rule of law”.44 The number of people killed during the red terror campaign remains
indefinite. According to Weibel (2019), the scope of red terror crime is not limited to a random killings and
extra-judicial executions. Evidences show that more than 50,000 deaths might have took place in regional
wars with insurgents, much more were subjected to tortures and other forms of vigorous state violence. As
one study puts it, the estimated people killed ‘ranges from 150, 000 to 500,000’.45 In a recent entry to
Oxford Encyclopedia, one observer puts:
“…on such casualty figures one must add the tens of thousands who were subjected to torture and
often lengthy extrajudicial detention, and the hundreds of thousand whose lives were profoundly
affected by the mental health crisis, the loss of loved ones and their social and economic support,
and the widespread exile that attended the Red Terror for so many.46
In the words of Human Rights Watch/Africa Watch (1991), the red terror campaign, has been characterized
as “one of the most systematic uses of mass murder by the state witnessed in Africa”.47 Paradoxically,
however, the human atrocity of Derg red terror is one of the significant events of untold history and how
that violent past has been dealt with has not been rigorously analyzed.
3. Dealing with Past Wrongs: An Overview of Transitional Justice Measures
The world has witnessed a turbulent mass violence committed by state and non-state actors over the years.
As Williams and Buckley-Zistel noted, “the 20th century has often been labeled the century of genocides
and mass violence [and…] questions regarding the perpetration of violence continue to be pertinent”.48 The
legacies of past atrocities during the violent conflict involves the commission of serious crimes such as
mass murder, forced disappearances, war crimes, mass rape, ethnic cleansing, acts of genocide, and crimes
of other form against humanity.49 These horrors took place in such places as the Holocaust, Armenia,
Cambodia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and many other African, Latin American and Balkan
countries.50 Transitional justice as a field of enquiry and also political practice is concerned with the
questions of how to deal with the massive human rights violations, ensure accountability and be transformed
in to the establishment of a decent civil order in the wake of gross violation of human rights. 51 It is often
pursued ‘following periods of political turmoil, state repression, or armed conflict.’52 As Olsen, Paine &

44

Tronvoll et al, (2009), p. 4)
Tronvoll et al, 2009 p. 4.
46
Weibel, (2017), ibid, no p.no)
47
As cited in Firew K. Tiba, (2013)
48
Timothy Williams and Buckley-Zistel (2018), Perpetrators and Perpetrators of Mass Violence: Actions, Motivations
and Dynamics (1st ed.), p. 1.
49
Newman, (2002 as cited in Nevin T. Aiken, (2013), Identity, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice: Overcoming
Intracticability in Divided Societies, Oxon: Routledge.p. 1).
50
William A. Schabas, (2002), The Abolition of Death Penality in International Law (3rd ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press; Jennifer Balint, (2016), Genocide, State Crime, ibid.
51
See Eisikovits, Nir (2014 [2017], Transitional Justice, In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/justice-transitional/>.);
See also Claudio Corradetti, Nir Eisikovits, Jack V. Rotondi, (eds.) (2015), Theorizing Transitional Justice, Surrey:
Ashgate; Nevin T. Aiken, (2013), Identity, Reconciliation, ibid.
52
Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Paine & Andrews G. Reiter (2010), Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing
Processes, Weighing Efficacy, Washington, D, C: United States Institute of Peace, p. 1.
45
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Reiter (2010) observed, these mechanisms of transitional justice fall in to ‘three broad, overlapping
categories:
“mechanisms of accountability for past crimes, including trials, truth commissions, and lustration
policies; victim-oriented restorative justice mechanisms, including reparations, construction of
monuments, and public memory projects; and mechanisms of security and peace, including
amnesties and pardons, constitutional amendments, and institutional reforms.”.53
It often concerns what Michael Newman54 says contending views, an idea which explains the struggle to
face inherent difficulties faced after past atrocities “and the legacy of such violations will continue far
beyond the establishment of new regime or government.
Transitional justice is the field in a constant growth and expansion,55 and its meanings and subjects also
expanded considerably over the years. This constant growth also broadened its scope and activities,
‘making it complex and contested term for academics and practitioners”.56 As Cheryl Lawther and Luke
Moffett recently noted, even today, there is a considerable debate about what the transitional justice is and
its main goals and dynamics.57 Ruti Teitel, who for the first time coined the term, defines transitional justice
as “the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses
to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.”58
Generally, however, the concept of transitional justice has expanded and summarizes the concerns of how
the new regimes deals with the human rights abuses committed by their predecessor regimes or actors.
Though the general concerns of the transitional justice have been the above one, various definitions have
been provided by different authors and organizations. According to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan,
transitional justice is formalized with in the UN system. A widely cited ‘Report of the Secretary-General
defines Transitional Justice as:
[. . .] the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to
terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and
achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with
differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions,
reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.59
53

Olsen, Paine & Reiter (2010), Transitional Justice in Balance, ibid. P. 1.
Michael Newman (2019), Transitional Justice: Contending with the Past, Cambridge: Polity Press.
55
Catherine Turner (2017), Transitional Justice and Critique, In Cheryl Lawther, Luke Moffet and Dov Jacobs (eds),
A Research Handbook of Transitional Justice, Edward Elgar, pp. 52-73.
56
Louis F. Monroy-Santander, 2018). Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Challenges and Complexities of Transitional
Justice, In Fabio Andres Diaz Pabon (ed.), Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia: Transitioning from
Violence, Routledge
57
. Cheryl Lawther and Luke Moffett, 2017, Introduction-Researching Transitional Justice: The Highs, the lows and
the expansion of the Field, In Cheryl Lawther, Luke Moffet and Dov Jacobs (eds), A Research Handbook of
Transitional Justice, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, p. 3.
58
Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy” (2003) 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal, p. 16; see also Ruti Teitel,
Transitional Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000), p. 3.
59
UN (2004), Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and PostConflict Societies’.
54
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Attempts at bringing perpetrators to justice in post-conflict settings is not new a phenomenon in history of
transitions. According to Claudio Corradetti, Nir Eiskovits and Volpe Rotondi, the philosophical debate
over transitional justice can be traced back to ancient Greece. According to them, the Athenians were said
to have addressed some of the key questions of transitional justice in the ‘triology of The Oreteia “where
Athena played the transitional role of casting the decisive vote for pardoning Orestes and saving him from
the Furies (the Erinnyes).”60
Originally, transitional justice emerged as a narrow sphere of inquiry, with a focus on traditional concerns
of prosecutions, truth telling, restitution and institutional reform. This was because, in its original
understanding, transitional justice measures were meant to deal with a transition from authoritarianism to
liberal democracy, and this informed the kinds measures to be taken.61 These were drawn on the
consequentialist lines in the sense that they were meant to smooth the transition. The transitional justice
measures, especially in the context of immediate post-cold War context such as criminal prosecution, truth
telling, lustration and reparation were implemented cautiously because they were feared to imperil peaceful
transitions.62 As McAuliffe argues, though the international community of human rights for long has shown
that it is desirable to ensure accountability or acknowledgement as the ends themselves.63
According to Naomi Roht-Ariazza, 64 the history of war crime trials can be traced back as far as to 14th
century. The aftermath of both world wars was also followed by trials despite their success or pitfalls.
Crimes such as tortures and its perpetrators were brought to trials in Greek in 1970s; post-Franco Spain saw
reparation efforts and the same story appears in post-Salazar Portugal.65 In the post-Cold War period, some
measures were taken in transition from dictatorship in Latin America and Philippines and marked by
negotiated settlement of transition in post-Apartheid South Africa.66
The conception of idea of transitional justice and its emergence as a ‘self-standing field of inquiry’ is
related to the post-Cold War ‘third-wave of democratization’ as it took place specially in Latin America as
the concept is employed as a ‘means of facilitating the evolution of those states involved, from bloody
dictatorships to liberal democracies’. 67 Throughout, the transitional justice responses to mass atrocities has
been considered as an ‘integral element of liberal peacebuilding. Literature treats transitional justice as
‘central to contemporary peacebuilding efforts’.68 As such, it is considered as an application of liberal
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justice concept to political change, and “includes not only juridical answers to past repressions, but also
restorative, administrative and economic measures”.69 As Kieran McEvoy notes, however, this new field
of inquiry has been signified by a trend of ‘the dominance of legalism’.70 According to him, transitional
justice is annexed to international criminal justice by lawyers and ‘it has ‘become over dominated by
narrow, legalistic lens which impedes both scholarship and praxis’.71 As such, the original focus of
transitional justice emerged as a narrow sphere of inquiry, with a focus on traditional concerns of
prosecutions, truth telling, restitution and institutional reform. This was because, in its original
understanding, transitional justice measures were meant to deal with a transition from authoritarianism to
liberal democracy, and this informed the kinds measures to be taken.72 These were drawn on the
consequentialist lines in the sense that they were meant to smooth the transition.
Judicial accountability for serious violations of human rights were sought after the immediate World War
II period chiefly marked by Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials carried out on Axis powers, and attempts were
made to prosecute them in domestic courts. 73
According to Willima Schabas74, the Nuremberg Trials contributed to the evolution of the transitional
justice field. It held that to initiate a war of aggression is an international crime, and atrocities committed
by a government against its own people are punishable as an international crime-these was drawn from then
emerging human rights movement. Nuremberg also contains the suggestion that international responsibility
is imposed upon states to ensure that perpetrators of international crimes are brought to justice”.75 ‘Since
1989, the use of international judicial institutions to hold accountable those who are accused of perpetrating
atrocities has burgeoned”.76 This saw the establishment of ad hoc international tribunals and the also the
negotiation of Rome Statute of ICC in 1998 which entered in to force in 2002.77
Expounding its vital precedent setting role, professor Schabas says: “Centuries from now, the Nuremberg
trial will be seen as one...defining moment” in human history, “if it is not already”.78 Though criminal trials
seemed to be the most important instrument to be employed during transitional justice in earlier days, the
legal redress available for mass atrocity has been inadequate particularly after the 1970s. With
democratization process ongoing in Eastern Europe, Latin America and others, new dimensions such as
truth commissions, lustrations and others took the center to reckon with the brutal past. The role for criminal
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trials, though important in transitional justice, was criticized as narrow79, however, only to be reinstated to
its leading position of primacy during Yugoslavia conflict and trial in the 1990s.
Drawing its foundational inspiration from the Nuremberg trials, the contemporary understanding of
transitional justice has been expanded after the overthrow of dictatorships in Latin America, the end of Cold
War politics, the largescale conflicts in the Balkan region, and widespread violence in Africa and Asia.80
The transitional justice measures, especially in the context of immediate post-Cold War context such as
criminal prosecution, truth telling, lustration and reparation were implemented cautiously because they
were feared not to imperil peaceful transitions.81 As McAuliffe argues, though the international community
of human rights for long has shown that it is desirable to ensure accountability or acknowledgement as the
ends themselves82.
The international tribunals are criticized for their retroactive nature, and this happens according to Schabas,
due to the ‘inevitable consequence of their political dimension’, and their incomplete structures.83
Transitional Justice has also its face in Africa. However, is complex and multifaceted’84, and in the words
of Jessica Johnson and George H. Karekwaivanane, exhibits ‘divergent understandings and experiences of
justice from across the continent’85, more broadly. The establishment of Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in post-Apartheid South Africa in 1995 and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) in 1990s and ICC’s continued focus on Africa also made the African continent a center of ‘looming’
academic works and debates in transitional justice.86 Jasmina Brankovic and Hugo van der Merwe (2019)
further note that other factors such as democratization efforts following Cold War, South Africa’s TRC
influence and ‘prominence of international bodies’ operating in the continent through their interventions
has made Africa a prominent subject in the study of transitional justice. According to Anders and Zenker,
what distinguishes African measures on transitional justice from the Latin American counterpart is that the
latter implemented it against the abuse of rights by the authoritarian regimes while the former implemented
it in response to widespread violence and civil wars.87 “Rather than rejecting transitional justice as yet
another externally imposed agenda, African institutions are articulating their own values and norms that
draw on African human rights frameworks and reflections on national experiences within the continent”.88
This latter position is reflected in the recent adoption of AU Transitional Justice Policy in August 2018.89
79
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As we noted above, during the first generation of the transitional justice measures, much emphasis has been
given to the criminal prosecution of the perpetrators along with efforts to establish truth commissions.90
Further studies in the field of transitional justice revealed, however, that single approach to reckoning with
the past has proved inadequate so that a wide range of measures should be considered within the transitional
justice field.91 Focus should go beyond holding perpetrators accountable, and it should also involve truth
telling and victims reparations.
Transitional justice has ‘ambitious’ goals which aims at transformation of societies or their regeneration in
a post-war socio-economic life.92 As Kora observes, it involves taking a wide range of measures, including
political, economic, cultural, sociological and psychological measures.93 Among diverse claims about the
outcomes of transitional justice, justice, truth, reparation, and reconciliation are generally seen as the most
widely cited measures.94 As Naomi Roht Ariazza convincingly puts it, “[O]nly by interweaving, sequencing
and accommodating multiple pathways to justice could some kind of larger justice in fact emerge”.95
4. The Post-1991 Ethiopia’s Approach to Dealing with the Derg-era Crimes

4.1. Which Type of Transitional Justice Measure for Ethiopia?
Kim and Hong demonstrated that a post-conflict state’s decision to select a transitional justice measure over
another is determined mainly by the outcomes of the newly ended wars. 96 According to them, criminal
trials are most likely to take place where there is ‘decisive, one-sided victory’ whereas truth commissions
and reparations are results of negotiated settlements. Non-negotiated transitions took place after Armenian
genocide, Rwanda genocide, Cambodia after Khmer Rouge, former Yugoslavia, and Ethiopia.97 Negotiated
transitions happened in post-Apartheid South Africa and former military regimes in Latin America.98 As
Kieran McEvoy notes, during the post-conflict trials, “law becomes an important practical and symbolic
break with the past, an effort to publicly demonstrate a new-found accountability and legitimacy”.99
After the Marxist dictatorship of Derg was toppled in 1991, the new victorious rebels led by Tigrayan
Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF) established a coalition called EPRDF and controlled the political
power.100 It soon organized a July 1991 Peace Conference, drafted a Transitional Charter, and established
90
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Transitional Government of Ethiopia (hereinafter TGE).101 The next key agenda was how to deal with the
Derg-era crimes.
Ethiopia chiefly adopted post-conflict trial from among alternative measures. According to then leader,
Meles, the government’s decision was prosecution,102 it did not intend to establish truth and reconciliation
commission, and amnesty was ruled out since it “would send a wrong signal for the people and future
politicians”.103 Moreover, no international nor hybrid tribunals were opted.104 Massive lustration measuresa legal mechanism to disqualify and restrict civil and political rights of former officials-were implemented
with proclamation No. 3/1991 which under Art. 8 provided “..[N]o Working Party of Ethiopia (WPE) or
security members may participate in any political activity”.105 This restriction later also extended to judges
by other law, which resulted in purging of numerous judges at all levels (ibid).106

4.2. The Establishment of SPO and Mass Trials of ‘Red Terror’ Crimes
In 1992, the TGE established SPO as a responsible organ which the state employs to deal with political
crimes of the past regime. From its establishing proc. No 22/1992, its core function is:
“[T]o conduct investigations and institute proceedings in respect of any person having committed
or responsible for the commission of an offence by abusing his position in the party, the government
or mass organization under the Derg-WPE regime.”.107
In addition, its ancillary duty is also provided in the preamble:
“In the interest of a just historical obligation to record for posterity the brutal offences committed
[…] against the people of Ethiopia and to educate the people and make them aware of those
offences in order to prevent the recurrence of such a system of government”.108
At the beginning of the process, the SPO reiterated that amnesty is rejected to discharge Ethiopia’s
international obligation to bring perpetrators to trial.109 The chief prosecutor of SPO, Girma Wakijira, was
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the former EPRP member and survivor of Red Terror whom critics equated to “appointing a holocaust
survivor as a prosecutor for the Nuremberg Tribunal”110. Following its establishment, the SPO focused on
prosecutions and undertook a lengthy, challenging and risky job of investigations against the former
officials and disbanded army.111 The special prosecutors of SPO “were engaged in controversial, demanding
and often distressing or dangerous work…”112. In a 17 pages Report submitted to the UN Office at Geneva
in January 1994, the SPO explained about its activities, progresses, challenges and called on states to
extradite fugitives voluntarily, ‘as a matter of comity’.113
5. Analysis of Ethiopia’s Response for Past Wrongs in Light of the Transitional Justice Frameworks
In this section I shall focus only on four broader frameworks such as Truth, Accountability, Reconciliation,
and Reparation (TARR). It is to be acknowledged that some of these TARR framework measures
commonly employed today were not common as such back in early 1992 and judging Ethiopia’s measures
by current standards may be contested. But, for want of standardized framework of analysis, I will employ
them to briefly examine whether the measures conformed to TARR frameworks and achieved the broader
goals of transitional justice.

5.1. The Criminal Accountability: Mass Prosecution of Derg Officials
The concept that individuals who commit the international crimes such as genocide, crime against humanity
and war crimes are responsible for their perpetration has been considered as the lasting legacy of the
international tribunals such as Nuremberg and Tokyo trials established after the WWII.114According to its
proponents, in transitional justice processes, trials and prosecutions are sought to be the most meaningful
and legitimate measure to deal with the past atrocities. It seriously takes the view that past wrongs can be
effectively dealt with by demonstrating that no one is above the law and thereby attempting to ensure the
rule of law. It is part of the ceremony to reckon with the past and to create a certain historical narrative
engrained in trials, cross-examinations, admissions, and court judgements. It has been argued that criminal
prosecutions are one of the important avenues to give ‘recognition to the victims as right holders, and it
also has a role of establishing the trustworthy of the legal and judicial system particularly in a situation
where the rule of law and fair trial.115 Accordingly, the legitimacy of the new order can be maintained only
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by disallowing impunity on the basis of the strict adherence to criminal law provisions. While collective
punishment of the vanquished en masse would precipitate discontent and sow the breeds the seeds of
resentment, individualization of responsibility through judicial courts “would secure in the person punished
the conviction of guilt.116
According to Huyse, bringing perpetrators of heinous state crimes to justice serves two principal roles:
firstly, it “advances the cause of building or reconstructing a morally just order. The second reason has to
do with the consolidation of the regime that succeeds the authoritarian order or of a just-won peace”.117 So,
in transitional justice processes, trials are seen as part of the ceremony to reckon with the past and to create
a certain “historical narratives engrained in trials”, and court judgements.118 By putting law at the center, it
also has a role of establishing the trustworthy of the legal and judicial systems.119
On the other hand, punishment in the context of transition, in societies coming out of extended violence
may prove difficult. For instance, as Murphy notes, those who committed serious human rights violations
may ‘still wield influence and threaten transition if prosecuted”.120 This refers to a long-debated ‘peacejustice dilemma’. Evidences of violence may be lost or destroyed which might make the prosecution process
unsuccessful.121 This challenges in prosecution has led many post-conflict (transitional societies) to adopt
other measures which may be termed as alternative mechanisms to reckon with past wrongs.122 The other
alternatives for instance would include truth commissions, reparations, lustrations. This alternative means
employed remained debatable as far as the theory of retributive justice is concerned, which emphasizes that
the perpetrators of massive human rights violations need to be punished to serve justice and correct them
(ibid). Generally, Cheryl S. White notes that ‘The rationale informing the choice of trials as post-conflict
justice mechanisms … was that of accountability and deterrence of perpetrators’.123 Some states also sought
to establish historical records through court trials. However, the effort in creating historical narratives
through court judgement has been contested on the basis that is inadequate to establish fuller and broader
images.
In Ethiopia, after a difficult and lengthy investigation, the SPO managed to file 360 cases on October 1994
against top Derg officials who were suspected of committing Red Terror crimes.124 While much of the cases
were brought before then Central High Court, other regional supreme courts also tried several cases.125
Regarding the initial classification of charges:
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“… the SPO charged three groups of alleged perpetrators in the Red Terror trials. The first group
consists of defendants who were policymakers and senior government and military officials of the
Derg government and 146 in number. The two other groups of defendants were military and civilian
field commanders that carried out orders as well as passed down orders, 2,433 in numbers, and
[third], the individuals who actually carried out many of the orders, 2,619 in number.”126
Generally, between 1992 and SPO’s final report in 2010, about 384 criminal investigation files were opened
throughout the country. The charges brought by the SPO mentions that 12,315 individuals were killed
during Red Terror.127 The charges brought against the defendants included genocide,128 crimes against
humanity, torture, murder, unlawful detention, rape, forced disappearances, abuse of power and war crimes,
among others.129
A total of 5,198 people were prosecuted and 5,119 underwent full trial.130 About 2,258 individuals were
tried in regional supreme courts. From the total individuals charged, 2,188 were tried in absentia, and
“remaining 2,931 appeared before the courts”.131 All Derg officials who appeared pleaded not guilty on
varying lines of arguments.132 According to HRW’s report in 1997, until 1997, 28 detainees died in custody
due to poor medical support133, and the prison conditions were reported as “very unsatisfactory”.134 About
8,000 witnesses of prosecution testified, and “15,214 pieces of documentary evidence were tendered during
the trials.”.135
The case SPO vs. colonel Mengistu Hailemariam et al, the first to be instituted and is the famous case
against the top leaders of the Derg.136 This file which runs more than 8000 pages,137 lumped together 106
126
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defendants, and among them, 105 were found guilty (except top official, corporal Begashaw who is
acquitted), and 52 of them were sentenced to death.138 Specifically, Mengistu was convicted of genocide
on December 12, 2006 by a Federal High Court and sentenced to life in prison but later the sentence was
increased on appeal on May 26, 2008 to a death sentence. A total of 52 death sentences, 182 life in prison
sentences, and 921 sentences of rigorous imprisonment from 15 to 25 years were imposed.139 The trial
process of Derg officials was so protracted which undermined its relevance but the fact that they were
convicted garnered support among the families of victims.140
To conclude, from a closer reading of the process, we should note two important points. Firstly, Red Terror
is not the only crimes committed during Derg days. It is rather, “one of the many faces of human rights
abuses committed for seventeen years (1974–91) of the Derg’s rule”.141 Moreover, crimes committed by
other groups who even triggered initial hostility were never prosecuted or condemned, which is criticized
as unjust and partial. Secondly, one should also note that the situation of the Red Terror trials “were not
scenarios in which all the accused were convicted across the board”.142 For those who were sentenced to
death, the sentence remained unenforced as it should be certified by the Republic’s President, and he/she is
authorized to commute death penalty to life imprisonment which he did.143 In 2011, “those who had served
two-thirds of their sentences were released on parole”.144 Moreover, one of the serious limitations of the
prosecution process is that except a few instances, those tried in abstentia never served their sentences.
Most notably, the master mind of Red Terror, Mengistu enjoys sanctuary in Zimbabwe until today.

5.2. Establishing Truth
Seeking to deal with the past wrongs also increasingly has been approached through the intermediary of
truth commissions as an alternative to criminal trials. The use of Truth commissions as an alternative or
complementary to criminal prosecutions has begun from the experience of Chile.145 The 1995 South African
TRC draws a lesson from a Chilean experience (ibid). Truth commissions were defined by Hayner as: Those
bodies that share the following characteristics:
… (1) truth commission focus on the past; (2) they investigate a pattern of abuse over a period of
time, rather than a specific event; (3) a truth commission is a temporary body, typically in operation
for six months to two years, and completing its work with the submission of a report; and (4) these
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commissions are officially sanctioned, authorized, or empowered by the state (and sometimes also
by the armed opposition, as in a peace accord”.146
According to Colleen Murphy, truth commissions “do not focus primarily on individual perpetrators and
victims in isolation, but rather on patterns of interaction and structures of institutions that permit, sanction,
or promote such patterns”.147 Like amnesty, truth commissions document the actions, but does not take
retributive measure such as criminal punishment imposed by the state. As Luc Huyse summarizes, “...Truth
commissions should unearth and reveal the whole truth-or as much as possible to find. They should ensure
that suspected perpetrators are prosecuted”.148
One of the desirable qualities of truth commissions is that they are less confrontational and at the same time
they do not ignore the violations and make efforts to do something for the victims.149 In the transitional
justice literature, truth commissions help to neutralize and mediate the competing contradictions between
‘forces of denial and acknowledgement’.150 Truth commissions are remembered for their contribution to
mark the move away from the prosecution model on the principle of individualized criminal responsibility
to a wider “effective and necessary component of peacebuilding”.151
In the transitional justice literature, truth inquiry bodies or commissions are remembered for their
contribution to mark the move away from the prosecution model on the principle of individualized criminal
responsibility to a wider “effective and necessary component of peacebuilding”.152 They are also viewed as
ones which help to neutralize and mediate the competing contradictions between ‘forces of denial and
acknowledgement’.153
The most notable truth commission was the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
established with the Act 34 of 1995.154 It was charged with “establishing as complete a picture as possible
of the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights which ... as well as facilitating the
granting of amnesty ... and by recommending reparation measures in respect of them”.155 According to Nir
Eiskovitis, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission ‘with its amnesty-for-truth
arrangement’, was the resulting political compromise meant to avoid both punishment and impunity’. 156
Initially, the ANC demanded for retributive justice was rejected because it was feared that it would derail
the ‘chance for a democratic South Africa”.157

. Hayner cited in Joanna R. Quinn, 2017, The Development of Transitional Justice in … p. 21.
Murphy (2017, p. 11)
148
Luc Huyse (2009), All Thingd Pass,ibid, p. 189.
149
Roht-Arriaza, (2006), ibid, p. 3.
150
. Stan Cohem 2001 cited in Cheryl Lawther, (2017), Transitional Justice and Truth Commissions, in Research
Handbook of Transitional Justice, p. 342 ff, p. 342.
151
Cheryl Lawther, (2017), Transitional Justice and Truth Commissions, ibid.
152
(Stan Cohem 2001 cited in Cheryl, 2017, p. 342).
153
Cheryl, 2017, p. 342).
154
du Bois-Pedain, A. (2007). Transitional Amnesty in South Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge: University Press.
155
du Bois-Pedain, ibid, p. 19, emphasis added.
156
Nir Eiskovitis (2014).
157
(Nir, 2014).
146
147

18
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jacaps/vol4/iss2/6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/2325-484X.4.2.1142

Legide: The Facets of Transitional Justice and Red Terror Trials in post-1991 Ethiopia

Despite its strong role as an alternative to trials and prosecutions, and also providing a forum for public
dialogue,158 truth commissions have number of challenges. They are criticized in that revealing truth
through dialogue may become an ‘impediment’ to national reconciliation as “it can also promote animosity,
reopen wounds and increase political instability”.159
Truth Commissions are also criticized on the ground that ‘these commissions often lead to the creation of
the official, state-sanctioned version of the violent past.’ This leads to imposition of a particular version of
conflict, defined role for perpetrators and this again makes ‘multiplicity of the individual experiences and
interpretations of an armed conflict less visible”.160 Hence, this results in controversies about what is truth
and whose version of truth is being presented by the truth during the process of officially sanctioned truthfinding processes.161
As Girmachew observed, there were attempts by the 33 top Derg officials on trial who requested then prime
minister Meles Zenawi to give them a forum to forward their side of the story where they “beg the Ethiopian
public for their pardon for the mistakes done knowingly or unknowingly”.162 However, “in order to protect
the victor’s interpretation of events… the government have remained silent about the request”.163 Asked
about the government’s approach, Meles said: “We didn’t think of a a truth and reconciliation
commission”.164 It is worthy to note that due to SPO’s investigation and trials, much evidence has been
obtained and better is known about Red Terror crimes. The SPO also produced a 441 pages volume book
in Amharic in 2010, which is, however, not like report of truth or enquiry commissions but summary of
trials.165
The following also captures the pitfalls:
“Ethiopia’s choice of prosecution as a transitional justice model means that stories of the sad
episode are mainly told through the official channels of court documents and witness testimonies
in an adversarial setting. Yet adversarial court proceedings are not necessarily the best
mechanisms for getting the true picture of events surrounding the crimes committed”.166
Marshet also aptly observes that “[….], due to the inherent limitation of judicial processes in establishing
the social truth, the comprehensive truth is not unearthed by such means. It is submitted that a truth finding,
and historical clarification commission should have been established as complementary to the
accountability process”.167 As one recent study observes, there is also a mismatch between the expectations
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of the criminal trials and the actual outcomes because during trial the witnesses and defendants rationalize
their actions and speak ‘legalese’, not only ordinary explanation of the events.168

5.3. National Reconciliation?
Reconciliation has long been associated with transitional justice and it is also one of its major goals.169
According to Nevin Aiken, there has been an emerging consensus which claims that there exists a causal
link relationship between transitional justice, reconciliation and durable peace.170 This is because
transitional justice measures can serve as a tool to “facilitate societal reconciliation by helping those divided
by past violence to put aside their antagonisms and to begin to build a new, more conciliatory relationships
with one another”.171 Opponents of retributive measures argue that solid peace and democratic
transformation can only be achieved when we tolerate the past wrongs and focus on national
reconciliation.172
Fisher underscores that the need for reconciliation is strongly felt in societies that ‘have gone through a
process of ethnopolitical conflict, as these are marked by a loss of trust, intergenerational transmission of
trauma and grievances, negative interdependence’.173 The fact that those who have engaged in violent
conflict are also bound to live in a closer proximity with each other makes reconciliation a necessary
endeavor. Not doing this may lead again to what Fisher terms ‘new spiral of violence’ and reconciliation
serves a necessary role to prevent or reduce ‘the desire for revenge’.174
Reconciliation is sometimes seen as related to forgiveness which is rooted in the traditions of Judaism and
Christianity, and some consider it as a goal whereas others consider it as a process.175 Specifically, in local
contexts, culture and religion may put great influence on the process of reconciliation. Ruthi Kattumuri and
Amalie Kvame Holm (2011) also maintain that forgiveness is important measure which helps compliment
the healing of individuals and restoration of societal harmony. Forgiveness can relieve the burdens created
by wrongful actions and intolerable debts and suggests that both victim and perpetrator can start afresh
(Digeser 2001). It might even imply the reestablishment of moral equality between the parties (Kattumuti
and Holm, 2011). 176
SIDA suggests that it is imperative for the efforts of reconciliation to pay greater attention to the ‘connecting
tissues’ or ‘social fabric’ that connects together the society. Sida also proposes that human rights-based
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approach should be integrated in the reconciliation process, and it should not be imposed on the
victims/survivors. In order to reduce collective animosity and communal violence, Aiken suggests that
reconsideration of institutional design should be made to engage the fundamental issues of collective
identity at the grassroot of collective human rights violations.177 A strategy should be sought as part of
transitional institutions which contribute to neutralizing or reducing group antagonisms related to group
identifications on ethnonational and racial lines which may incite future violence.178 He further suggests
that a strong dialogue should be pursued with the works of complex dynamics of conflict transformations
in divided societies to move towards more reconciled relations. Paul Seils179 urges that since the meaning
and aim can vary from place to place, understanding specific context is ‘particularly important’ for any
discussions about reconciliation in transitional justice.
In Ethiopia, the request by the top Derg officials to ‘ask forgiveness’ from the Ethiopian people met with
the silence of government. The defense lawyers for the corpse of Red Terror trials were also reported to
have raised that reconciliation should be sought instead of prosecution since the cases are so ‘complex and
difficult’ to be settled in trials. However,
… [In response], the SPO … went on to aver that not to prosecute flew in the face of the rights of
the victims. Apart from this, so the [SPO] affirmed, the Ethiopian government was obligated to
prosecute the accused for having allegedly committed the crimes.180
This implied that there was a ‘rigid’ application of retributive model, which is susceptible to result in
‘victor’s justice’. And at its extreme, “rather than healing and reconciling national wounds, ‘victor’s justice’
may broaden and worsen” the national contradiction.181 Ethiopia could have seized such opportunity to
achieve a larger national reconciliation and build consensus among its divided society.

5.4. Reparation for the Victims
Reparations are also considered as an alternative transitional justice measure to retributive
justice/accountability. According to Brandon Hamber, reparations are simply defined as ‘things done or
given as an attempt to deal with the consequences of political violence’.182 Pablo de Greiff holds that the
mainstream transitional justice studies has given enormous attention to the measures of criminal trials of
human rights violators, but ‘much less attention has been paid to ...efforts by way of reparations for the
victims’.183 He contends that from the perspective of the victims of human rights violations, reparations [in
the form of material compensation] should be placed at the center of transitional justice measures in postconflict settings or in transitions to democracy. Prosecution may be successful in bringing to trials the
perpetrators to justice) though may not be fully successful for several reasons); truth commissions may help
177
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to disclose the fate of those killed or disappeared, and also provide sense of being recognized due to official
acknowledgement. Institutional reforms and engineering are more likely a long-term project and only have
indirect links to the lives of the victims. Therefore, as de Greiff puts it, “in the absence of other positive and
tangible manifestations, truth by itself can easily be considered as an empty gesture, as cheap and
inconsequential talk”.184 So, reparations have at least a direct touch upon the lives of the victims, so that
they should be placed at the center of the transitional justice measures. Argentina exemplifies the earliest
form of massive reparation programs of any in the Latin American transitions.185
In transitional justice field, reparation is often hailed as a measure which represents the “victim-centered
transitional justice measures by tailoring measures to victims’ needs”.186 Reparations have at least a
symbolic component in that they “acknowledge and recognize the individual’s suffering… can help
concretize a traumatic event, aid an individual to come to terms with it and help label responsibility”. 187
The Ethiopian prosecution measures did not have any reparation schemes for the victims. Numerous
individuals “who were identified by the judgments of the courts as victims of the Mengistu regime’s
egregious human rights violations have not been given any sort of compensation”.188This process failed to
put victims at the center and the moral and economic damages caused to the victims remain unaddressed.
6. Achievements and Challenges of the Red Terror Trials

6.1. Achievements
6.1.1.

Prosecution Symbolized Condemning ‘the Culture of Impunity’

For the first time in its history, and in Africa for that matter, Ethiopia tried to reckon with its past by its own
limited domestic capacity. The measures have been seen by commentators as “one of the most ambitious
efforts to prosecute former regime perpetrators ever undertaken...”.189 It was able to ensure, at least, a
minimal level of accountability and ensured that perpetrators will not go with impunity. Though protracted
and fails to satisfy standards of fair trail, the trial was able to deliver formal, thinner ‘justice’ which signaled
that perpetrators of political violence would learn that impunity has limits.190 As HRW legal counsel
commented, despite many odds, “we are definitely seeing a trend in which people who commit mass murder
are being brought to account".191 Moreover, the existence of SPO also helped to reduce the tendency of
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summary executions and revenge killings, by channeling grievances to be dealt with through legal
mechanisms of accountability.192
6.1.2. Establishment of Some truth, public records
As Vaughan193 notes, the early phase of the tasks of SPO was directed at collecting and compiling evidences
about the red terror crimes. As remarked above, its enabling law gave ancillary mandate to document
historical records, and the SPO achieved a relatively a good deal of success in this regard. It managed to
document and preserve the atrocious political crimes and stories of the victims in those evil days. Though
not neutral, expanded inquiry report, it also produced a summary of what it achieved in book form in 2010.
6.1.3.

The Establishment of Memorials

The other legacy of the red terror trials was the erection of Red Terror Martyrs Memorial monument at the
heart of Addis Ababa to honor the victims of Red Terror. It carried a catchphrase, ‘Never, ever, again!’. A
memorial museum has also been established recently in 2010 by independent efforts of Ant-Red Terror
committee, a charity established in 1991. However, the Ethiopian memorial attempts lack government
ownership and do not get sufficient attention which forced one author recently to say “the history of the
Red Terror is sidelined in contemporary politics”.194
5.2. Challenges and Limitations
5.2.1.

Failure to Adopt Broader Notion of Transitional Justice Measures

A progress in the field of transitional justice revealed that single prosecution method of reckoning with the
past has proved inadequate.195 As such, its conceptual notion should go beyond prosecutions and should
rest on some broader goals such as truth, public platform for victims, compensation to victims,
reconciliation and public deliberation.196 Even by then standards, Ethiopian trial process failed to take the
broader dynamics of transitional justice. Asked about whether the new government considers other
alternatives, then country’s leader Meles Zenawi responded: “…there was no plausible alternative. They
had to come to terms with the events of those years. The only legitimate way was a trial. For the victims
and the families of the victims this was the main thing”.197 As a result, much of the wider measures such as
truth finding, reconciliation, and reparation remains largely unaddressed. As one commentator noted, the
Red Terror trials in Ethiopia “are only a partial remedy to the massive human rights violations experienced
by the country in the past”.198 The evidence compiled by SPO is not accessible to the wider public, and its
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educative and deterrent power goes largely unnoticed.199 Failing to adopt a holistic approach, Ethiopia’s
transitional mechanisms seem to have failed to achieve broader objectives of transitional justice.
5.2.2.

Victor’s Interpretation of Justice

As writers in the post-conflict context point out, the transition period has other flaws. As McAuliffe
observes:
“Victory for insurgent forces also results most usually in one form of autocracy being replaced by
another...As familiar examples like Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Cote d’Ivoire make apparent,
transitional justice is apt to reinforce the power of the stronger party-victors’ justice and purges
directed at the loser of the conflict tends to trump reconciliation or toleration [...] while, the victor’s
ability to impose their narrative of conflict obviates the need for truth commissions to consider
cause, responsibility or reform...”.200
In this line, the EPRDF’s measures against Derg officials are also widely criticized as selective and ‘victor’s
justice against vanquished’.201 The key point is that the trial completely excludes the crimes committed by
other armed groups, including now victorious ones, and makes only Derg officials responsible202.
According to Tronvoll:
“The fact that the trials only address one segment of the red terror- the violations carried out by
the Derg-also fulfills specific purpose since the verdict in this way serve not only as the judgment
on the Derg regime but, simultaneously, serve as an implicit acquittal of the TPLF and other ethnic
resistance movements against the Derg regime...”.203
Added to this complexity is the ‘contradictory interpretation’ of the nature of the Ethiopian state. TPLF
waged a 17 years guerilla insurgency claiming to ‘abolish Amhara domination’ and sympathizing ethnic
autonomy.204 After victory, TPLF wanted to implement its version of Ethiopian state to be a federation
composed of various autonomous ethno-linguistic groups. Here, the trials of Red Terror “operate as a
political ritual whose function is to legitimate the new system of governance and its rulers.205 The critics,
largely from previously dominant Amhara elites, delegitimize the response measures as an attack against
Ethiopian unity denouncing the new Tigrayan ruling elites as narrow nationalists.206
5.2.3.

Mass Adjudication in a Weak, Under-resourced and Non-independent Judiciary and
Limits of Domestic Tribunal
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As highlighted in the foregoing, the Ethiopian red terror trial is seen as ‘ambitious’ case in Africa because
it was solely conducted by the Ethiopian courts and resources under the penal law of 1957. However, as
noted, this decision was not without formidable challenges. For one thing, Ethiopia was then one of the
least developed countries on the planet, also plagued by drought and decades of war. Moreover, Ethiopian
Red Terror trial process failed to involve important international actors and donors, while other countries
in a similar situation involved a ‘hybrid tribunals’ to withstand different constraints.207
The NGOs and other international support organs who initially involved in the process were not willing to
continue to operate .208 Much of the controversy arose as the defendants were detained for longer years
without trial, and also increased politicization of the trial, among others.209 Albeit these frictions, different
governments of Europe and N. America, responded by giving assistance for SPO.210 Argentina provided
forensic investigators for exhumations of mass graves.211
The other constraint relates to the weak judiciary infrastructure. During the Derg, “the courts were
subservient to the Mengistu regime”212 and after, they were demolished and under resourced. Judges and
prosecutors were inexperienced to carry out the complex, massive criminal trial of international nature.
This was further worsened by the shortage of judges following massive purge of judges from the courts.213
It also diminished the capacity of the judiciary and added to the problems of an overloaded system.214
The other related problem is bringing huge number of defendants in a single file. Surprisingly, 106
defendants were brought together on single criminal file of SPO vs Mengistu et al, while Nuremberg
Tribunal tried only 24 in single file, and maximum of only 7 for former Yugoslavia. As Firew 215
commented, this “demonstrates how unwieldy the Ethiopian counterpart has been when compared to similar
large-scale trials”. Lack of adequate provision of legal assistance through defense counsel also proved
challenge.216 As Human Rights Watch documented, SPO detained many defendants “for almost six years
before they were brought to court”.217 Moreover, the case of Mengistu which was instituted in October
1994, dragged on for nearly 17 years, only finally to be handed down in 2008. Due process of law was not
observed,218 and along with limited public ownership and participation, these “meant a process focused
more on elimination of a foe than any future transformation of the state”.219 Finally, those who were
convicted in abstentia did not serve their sentence which renders the efforts ineffective.
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Tribunals for the trial of perpetrators of international crimes consisted of both international and national
ones. As Leyh220 notes, despite the advantages of international tribunals in trying perpetrators and setting
precedent of accountability for violations and abuses, it also has limitations. According to Brianne Leyh,
the advantages of domestic prosecution of international crimes are numerous.
First, there are many practical benefits. Most domestic prosecutions can claim the benefit of proximity to
the evidence or proximity to the witnesses….to prove the guilt of the accused…or secure a conviction.
Local engagement with the court often provides legitimacy to the process.221
However, limitations to the processes of the domestic prosecutions are also numerous. The most striking
challenge and limitations to the domestic prosecutions of international crime, however, is that “when
political or ethnic tensions persist, purely domestic prosecutions may not be viewed as legitimate. There is
a danger that segment of the population will view the trials as show trials or as being biased towards one
side”.222
6.

Conclusion and Recommendations

After the demise of the Africa’s most brutal dictatorship of Derg, there was hope created by this opportunity
that a new chapter of transformation of political culture would take place in Ethiopia.223 Given its adverse
political and economic situation, adequate consideration should have been given to important aspects of
then available measures such as national reconciliation, wider truth inquiry, and amnesty. But the
government gave much emphasis for criminal trials. Nevertheless, this paper acknowledges that the Red
Terror trials attempted to avoid impunity, restrained summary executions and channeled the cases to be
settled at least through judicial mechanisms. Efforts to find truth through trials and producing memorials
helped to disclose the horrendous violence of Red Terror days.
However, the paper mainly argued that major limitations of the Ethiopia’s measure lies in its narrow
approach and rigidity in dealing with the past wrongs. Imposition of victor’s interpretation of justice, and
strict adherence to criminal trials alone in divided, impoverished and war-torn country, which ‘alienated
the Ethiopians from reconciling with their past’ renders it that the objective to heal wounds is not fully
utilized. As one recent work suggested, “moments of crisis are crucial to enabling opportunities for the
advance or retreat of inclusion agendas. … and respond to their opportunities is, therefore, important”. 224
The Ethiopian political tradition founded on domination and subordination225 also crippled honest and
inclusive negotiations during crisis. Moreover, judicial and institutional weaknesses severely hampered the
220
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due process of law during the trial, while ongoing human rights violations by new regime questioned the
legitimacy of the measures. These limitations coupled with what Merera terms ‘contradictory
interpretations Ethiopian historiography’226 constrained the capacity of the Red Terror trials that it falls
short of being translated into lasting legacy of meaningful socio-political transformation. Therefore, this
paper recommends that the current government should consider that the mandate of National Reconciliation
Commission established recently to deal with current political violence227 should also be widened to
integrate tragedy of Red Terror to corroborating SPO’s findings, addressing its deficiencies and foster
common understanding of that episode. The government should also make public important documents,
evidences, and should also establish national memorials to honor victims.
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